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METAPHORS AND MODELS OF LAW: 
THE JUDGE AS PRIEST 
Philip Soper* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The reasons that prompt people to try to identify laws or legal 
systems in advance of encounter are varied. One is that laws, though 
less concrete than chairs, are equally capable of posing obstacles to 
conduct: they can be stumbled over. If the desire to avoid such 
contact were the sole reason for trying to decide "what law is,'' 
Holmes' aphorism would work fairly well: by predicting judicial de-
cisions and calculating the likelihood of avoiding accompanying sanc-
tions, one could play a good game of "bad man's" bluff around legal 
obstacles to chosen courses of action. 
The claim that law is identified by more than this predictive as-
pect arises when one takes into account the perspective of individuals 
other than Holmesian "bad men"-the judge, for example, who 
looks to the law as a guide for, rather than a prediction of, his decis-
ion;1 or the individual who believes that valid norms yield obligations 
whether or not they are accompanied by sanctions. 
This variety of perspectives from which to view a phenomenon 
as complex as that of law2 poses a problem for the legal theorist. 
Unlike individuals within the society, the theorist stands outside par-
ticular legal systems, seeking features that distinguish such systems 
from other social phenomena that they resemble. Like the socio-
logist or scientist, the legal theorist has no apparent interest other 
than that of conceptual clarity. But this attempt at "neutral" defini-
tion often meets with two objections. First, the theorist may be told 
that the claim that certain features of law are more important or 
more the "essence" of law than any other is essentially arbitrary-
all depends on perspective. Second, he may be told that disputes 
about whether certain social structures are or are not "legal systems" 
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Washing-
ton University; J.D. 1969, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1972, Washington University, 
-Ed. 
1. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 10-11 (1961). 
2. Roscoe Pound, for example, associates distinct views of law with the perspec-
tive of individual, judge, lawyer, teacher, lawmaker, and entrepreneur. See R. 
POUND, II JURISPRUDENCE 130-31 (1959). 
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resemble disputes about whether a loveseat is a chair or a couch: 
what is important is not the classification, but the description of 
similarities and differences that might make distinct objects suitable 
or unsuitable for various purposes. 
Both objections can be avoided if the theoretical enterprise is less 
ambitious-if one is content, for 'example, to describe prominent fea-
tures of legal systems without concern for whether the description , 
is also part of the definition of law. This essay takes this less am-
bitious route in comparing four models of law with respect to their 
treatment of one particular legal phenomenon: the concept of legal 
obligation. Normative statements to the effect that one "ought" to 
obey the law, or that judges "ought" to apply one standard rather 
than another, are so commonly made within legal systems that most 
theorists attempt to account for this feature in the course of develop-
ing a general theory of law. Three such accounts that are examined 
· in this essay are drawn from theories of law developed by legal 
positivists. The fourth is not. The fourth account anticipates a 
model of law that lies somewhere between those developed by legal 
positivists on the one hand and by natural law theorists on the other. 
This fourth model finds the "essence" of a "legal" system in the fact 
that the officials who accept and enforce the system believe that its 
fundamental laws are just. 
I shall not attempt to prove that the view of legal normativity 
entailed by one of these models is preferable to the others as more 
or less "essential" to the concept of law. In that sense, the essay 
is a preliminary step in the development of a definition of law. At 
the same time, I hope that the distinct view of obligation that 
emerges from each theory will facilitate intuitive comparisons of each 
description with the actual phenomenon of legal obligation as per-
ceived by most subjects in particular legal systems. This comparison 
of description and phenomenon should provide at least a starting 
point for determining which view, if any, is more accurate and which, 
if any, is necessarily linked to the concept of law itself. 
The limited goal of this essay is accompanied by three additional 
limitations in scope and method. First, the essay is concerned pri-
marily with the connection between legal theory and legal obligation 
as it appears from or is ascribed to the role of the judge. The justi-
fication for this limitation in perspective builds on two basic intuitions 
underlying the claim that "law-applying" rather than "law-creating" 
institutions are central to the understanding of law.3 The first in-
3. See J. R.Az, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 129-31 (1975). 
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tuition is that the goal of the judge, however unobtainable or unreal-
istic in practice, is ideally to "find" rather than to "make" the law. 
To that extent the purpose of the judge and the legal theorist over-
lap: each is the ally of the other in attempting to discover neutral 
features that identify law in general, although the judge is also con-
cerned with applying the general theory to identify the specific 
norms of his particular legal system. The second intuition, shared 
by legal realists and recent positivists alike, is that there is a connec-
tion between efficacy and legal validity that requires one to focus 
primarily on law as it is applied and accepted in practice rather than 
as it is announced. To identify a system and its norms as legal where 
none of the norms are observed in fact is to so exalt theory over 
practice as to ignore the phenomenon for which the theory was in-
itially supposed to account. 
A second limitation of this essay is that it does not attempt to 
analyze or distinguish the concepts of "obligation" or "duty" or 
"norm" within the wider category of "ought" statements in general. 
That is to say, in distinguishing various descriptions of "legal obliga-
tion," I shall be distinguishing primarily the various reasons that a 
particular theory seems to accept as prima facie sufficient to ex-
plain (from the viewpoint of persons within the system) why one 
"ought" to obey the law or why a judge "ought" to apply a particular 
standard. These reasons may be self-regarding or other-regarding, 
prudential or moral. Whether "prudential oughts" are "norms" is 
thus a question with which I shall not be concerned, just as I shall 
also not consider the question whether one has a prima facie moral 
obligation to obey the law. 
This essay is also characterized and necessarily limited by its re-
liance on the metaphor as a shorthand device for conveying the rela-
tion between a particular theory and the account of normativity that 
the theory seems to entail. Professor Max Black observes that "[to] 
draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him-like 
praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting."4 Black proceeds, 
however, both to defend the philosophical use of metaphor and to 
suggest that the metaphor may convey cognitive content that cannot 
always be conveyed by nonmetaphorical translations. 5 I shall not ex-
plore or defend the use of metaphor here beyond noting that it is 
a technique to which Professor H. L. A. Hart, whose theory is a pri-
mary focus of this essay, also resorts in criticizing his positivist pre-
decessor, Austin. Austin's theory of law, Hart suggests, is the "gun-
4. M. BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS 25 (1962). 
5. See id. at 44-47. 
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man situation writ large,"6 to which Hart objects largely because of 
alleged defects in the resulting picture of legal obligation. One of 
the goals of this essay is to find an appropriate metaphor for Hart's 
own version of positivism. More particularly, this essay explores the 
following questions: What is the metaphorical role of the judge and 
the consequent view of legal obligation implied by the theories of 
the three major positivists-Austin, Kelsen and Hart? Is there a 
plausible alternative metaphor? What are the implications of the al-
ternative for legal theory and the concept of legal obligation? 
II. FOUR MODELS OF LAW 
A. Austin: The Judge as Henchman 
If Austin's view of law as the command of the sovereign is the 
"gunman situation writ large," the role of the judge presumably is 
that of a "henchman,"7 carrying out or passing on the gunman's 
orders, backed by threats, to the subjects of the legal system. 
Austin, of course, prefers less pejorative descriptions. For him, the 
judge is the "minister" or "trustee" of the sovereign, who communi-
cates the sovereign's orders or exercises tacitly or expressly dele-
gated power to issue orders himself. 8 
Hart's criticism of this account is well known and frequently re-
counted. A theory that describes law as consisting essentially of or-
ders backed by threats (henceforth, the "coercive model" of law) 
fails adequately to account for legal obligation. Under the coercive 
model, the minimally sufficient reason why one "ought" to obey the 
law is the purely prudential one of avoiding the threatened sanction. 
Hart concedes that legal systems may exist in which the private citi-
zens in the system view law in just such exclusively coercive terms: 
the only reason to obey is to avoid punishment. But, he argues, 
there is at least one group of citizens in a legal system-namely 
the judges or officials-who view law as imposing obligations, rather 
than merely obliging. For this group, deviation from the accepted 
legal standards becomes the occasion for legitimate criticism. Within 
this group, reasons for following the law are presumably advanced 
which do not refer simply to threatened legal sanctions. 0 
Just what sorts of reasons for compliance such a group might ad-
6. H. HART, supra note 1, at 7. 
7. See id. at 19. 
8. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 28, 142 & n.*, 
263-64 (London 1832). 
9. See H. HART, supra note 1, at 79-88, 111-13. 
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vance will be considered below. My interest at this point is in the 
extent to which Austin's theory must be seen as thoroughly commit-
ted to the coercive model of obligation that Hart criticizes.10 The 
difficulty in answering this question arises because Austin, in his lec-
tures on the Province of Jurisprudence Determined, appears pri-
marily concerned with accounting for the relationship between the 
sovereign and the ultimate subject of the sovereign's command-
Hart's private citizen. It is not clear what Austin might have said 
if he, like Hart, had turned his attention to the phenomenon of obli-
gation as it appears among the judges of the system. 
The text of Austin's lectures provides some basis for supposing 
that Austin would not describe obligation among the judges of a sys-
tem solely in terms of the coercive model. We have already noted 
that Austin refers to judges as the "ministers" or "trustees" of the 
sovereign. In discussing a sovereign's other political subordinates, 
also described as "trustees," Austin indicates that the terms of 
the trust may be enforced "by legal, or by merely moral sanctions. 
The [trustee] is bound by a positive law or laws: or it is merely 
bound by a fear that it may offend . . . in case it shall break the 
engagement which it has contracted with [the sovereign]."11 Aus-
tin thus accepts the possibility that the conduct commanded of judges 
(application of the sovereign's laws) may not itself be coerced by 
a specific threat annexed to the command-a characteristic mark of 
all "laws" properly so called.12 
This conclusion accords with the common observation that judges 
and officials in modern legal systems such as our own are often said 
to breach their official duties, even though no specifically legal pun-
ishment is provided for the breach.13 If the coercive model of law 
is thus insufficient, even for Austin, to account for the attitude of 
judges in such legal systems toward the "orders" they are carrying 
out, how is such official obligation to be described? The question 
may be approached, despite Austin's sparse account, by referring to 
the basic metaphor of the judge as henchman. Among the reasons a 
henchman/ judge might have for complying with the orders of a 
10. Hart admits, it should be noted, that Austin's concept of a "command" may 
not be reducible to the coercive model and that there may be other aspects of Aus-
tin's theory that are not fully consistent with the model. See H. HART, supra note 1, 
at 18-20. The point in the text is that even the gunman/henchman metaphor de-
parts in some respects from the coercive model and does so in ways that make the 
henchman metaphor arguably applicable to the theories of both Austin and Hart. 
11. J. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 240. 
12. See id. at 138-39. 
13. See J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 158. 
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gunman/ sovereign are the following: 
1) The judge may comply because of a threatened legal sanc-
tion; 
2) Absent the threat of a specific sanction, the judge may 
comply for other reasons of self-interest, ranging from the 
fear of being criticized or of incurring the sovereign's dis-
pleasure, to the desire to remain a henchman and enjoy 
the accompanying rewards of power, prestige, and com-
fort; 
3) The judge may independently decide that the sovereign 
has a right to command for moral or other reasons. 
All of these reasons for compliance, it is suggested, are consistent 
both with Austin's theory and with a view of the judge as henchman. 
If this suggestion is correct, it raises doubts, as we shall see, about 
the extent to which Hart's analysis in fact represents an advance 
upon the "gunman situation writ large." 
B. Kelsen: The Judge as Logician 
In The Pure Theory of Law,14 Kelsen rejects the coercive model 
of obligation for reasons that remind one of Hart's criticism of Aus-
tin: 
Everybody understands that it is one thing to say: "This behavior 
is a delict according to the law and ought to be punished according 
to the law"; and quite a different thing to say: "He who has done 
this will probably be punished." . . . The legal statements that one 
ought to behave in a certain way cannot be reduced to statements 
about present or future facts, because the former do not refer to such 
facts, not even to the fact that certain individuals wish that one ought 
to behave in a certain way.15 
Kelsen's response to the problem of accounting for or describing 
this noncoercive legal "ought" is like the logician's response to the 
problem of accounting for the axioms in a logical system: no such 
account is possible, at least not within the same system that includes 
the axioms. In this respect Kelsen's judge, who makes statements 
describing the conditions under which coercive sanctions ought to be 
applied, is like the logician: the validity of all such "ought" state-
ments depends on their derivation from a basic norm-that one 
ought to behave as the constitution prescribes. The validity of this 
basic norm is not open to judicial question but is simply "presup-
posed." 
14. H. KELSEN, THE PURE ToEORY OF LAW (1967). 
15. Id. at 104. 
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Kelsen's theory has led to confusion and criticism on two counts. 
First, it has been suggested that the somewhat mystifying notion of 
"presupposition" can be replaced with a much simpler and more ac-
curate account of the attitude of the judge toward the basic norm. 
The judge, unlike the logician, does not dispassionately posit the ul-
timate normative premise of the legal system that underlies his par-
ticular normative conclusions. Rather, his attitude toward the basic 
norm is one of personal commitment, belief, and acceptance. As 
Professor Hughes observes: 
Christian morals may be said to rest on the presupposition that 
Christ was divine; but the existence of a community of Christians 
rests on people holding the belief that Christ was divine. In the same 
way the existence of a legal community, as opposed to a model code 
constructed for the private edification of the draftsman, can ulti-
mately be analyzed only in terms of the actual attitudes and disposi-
tions towards basic procedures of the persons who make up the com-
munity.16 
Kelsen's theory may also be criticized for its inattention to the 
nature of the basic norm. Even logicians, after all, can provide ex-
tra-systematic or metatheoretical accounts of the primitives or axioms 
of their formal systems. Thus one might also expect Kelsen to dis-
cuss whether the basic norm is itself an "ought" proposition and, if 
so, what kind of an ought it is. 
Commentators have suggested two distinct views of the nature 
of such a basic norm. According to the first, the basic norm asserts 
that the provisions of the constitution and the resulting legal system 
"ought" to be accepted because they are justified. On this view, 
one who accepts the basic norm does so because he believes it is 
(morally) "acceptable." For such persons "[t]he concepts of the 
normativity of the law and of the obligation to obey it are analytically 
tied together."17 According to the second view, the basic norm as-
serts that the constitution ought to be accepted without regard to its 
merits. On this view the fact that the system is accepted by others 
is sufficient to explain the normativity of the law, even though there 
may be good reasons-reflected in other norms-for refusing to 
obey. Dr. Raz calls these two views, respectively, "justified" and 
"social" normativity.18 He also suggests that Kelsen uses only the 
concept of justified normativity-i.e., that the "ought" of particular 
16. Hughes, Validity and the Basic Norm, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 695, 703 (1971). 
17. Raz, Kelsen's Theory of the Basic Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIS. 94, 105 (1974). 
See id. at 103. 
18. Id. at 103. 
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judicial decisions and the basic norms they "presuppose" reflect a 
judicial belief that the system itself is justified. 
There is another possible interpretation of Kelsen, however, that 
does not restrict his theory to the concept of "justified normativity" 
and is at the same time more consistent with the metaphor of the 
logician and the language of presupposition that permeate Kelsen's 
writings. One may argue that Kelsen is committed to no particular 
concept of normativity on the part of those internal to the system. 
He is simply explaining the logical relationship between "ought" 
statements of whatever kind and the basic norm such statements pre-
suppose. Whatever judges mean by the statement that sanctions 
"ought" to be applied, that is also the meaning that must be given 
to the basic norm. This view, for example, would find even the 
coercive model of law compatible with Kelsen's account. If judges 
believed that the basic norm "ought" to be accepted only because 
of threatened sanctions, then the "ought" statements of particular 
legal judgments would also reflect only the same prudential force. 
It is true that Kelsen seems to think most judges in most legal sys-
·tems view the basic norm as justified, rather than as backed by 
threats, which explains why much of Kelsen's discussion is in similar 
terms: if judges claim sanctions are justified, it must be because for 
them the basic norm is also justified. But this claim is "in its char-
acter conditional and therefore hypothetical."19 Kelsen, in short, 
may be viewed only · as insisting, like Hume, that the normative 
force of particular legal judgments can only be as great as the norma-
tive force of the premises on which the judgment is based. 20 
Two passages in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law may be used as 
illustrations. In the first, Kelsen, himself a moral relativist, considers 
the possible objection that "the concept of the 'ought' . . . is sense-
less or merely ideological fallacy": 21 
If all meaning is denied to the norm . . . then it would be sense-
less to say: "this is legally permitted, that is forbidden;" "this belongs 
to me, that to you;" "X is entitled and Y is obligated." The thou-
sands of statements in which the law is expressed daily would be 
senseless. In contrast to this, the fact is undeniable that everybody 
understands readily that it is one thing to say: "A is legally obligated 
to pay $1,000 to B," and quite another: "There is a certain chance 
that A will pay $1,000 to B."22 
19. H. KELSEN, supra note 14, at 46. 
20. See generally D. HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, book III, pt. I, sec. 
I (1739). 
21. H. KELSEN, supra note 14, at 101. 
22. Id. at 104. 
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It seems clear that Kelsen is here defending an objective concept 
of obligation against the moral relativist. But he is defending this 
concept on the assumption that it is the concept used by people 
within the system. In such cases, the fact that the legal theorist, 
when describing a system, believes "oughts" are senseless, does not 
mean that the objective sense of obligation is unimportant to those 
within the system or can be ignored in giving an accurate theoretical 
account of the phenomenon of law. It is because of his sensitivity 
to such possibilities that sociologists as well as philosophers can 
claim Kelsen as one of their own. But if the judges and officials 
of the system are themselves moral relativists, no objective "ought" 
will be presupposed. The system will not be viewed as normative, 
but it may still be legal. Kelsen's purpose, in short, may be primarily 
to account for the empirical fact that most legal systems are viewed 
by their officials as normative and objectively justified; but the claim 
that only such systems can be "legal" is a definitional claim that Kel-
sen appears to assume but does not explicitly defend. 
A second passage that supports this interpretation may be found 
in Kelsen's comparison of a legal community and a gang of robbers. 
The only difference between the two, Kelsen suggests, is that in the 
coercive order of the terrorizing gang: 
no basic norm is presupposed according to which one ought to behave 
in conformity with this order. But why is no such basic norm presup-
posed? Because this order does not have the lasting effectiveness 
without which no basic norm is presupposed. . . . · [T]he coercive 
order regarded· as the legal order is more effective than the coercive 
order constituting the gang. 23 
Kelsen in the same passage indicates that, if the gang should succeed 
in effectively establishing control over a certain territory, it would 
then become a legal system and a state. 
The apparent implication of this passage is that a robber gang 
becomes a legal order for Kelsen, not because of any change in the 
internal normative attitude of the members of the gang, but simply 
by becoming able effectively to enforce its orders against nonmem-
bers. The resemblance to Austin's theory of law, with effectiveness 
(habitual obedience) as the key to locating independent sovereigns 
and thus independent legal systems, is striking. One might, of 
course, suggest that Kelsen assumes that a normative, attitudinal 
change will occur within the robber gang as a result of increased 
effectiveness; i.e., that Kelsen is making empirical claims about the 
psychological pre-conditions for adopting the necessary normative at-
23. Id. at 47, 48. 
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titude. But this ascribes to Kelsen an intent to offer "social science 
stabs at the psychology of the law abiding citizen" that seems "out-
side the scope and interest of the pure theory of law."24 
I do not intend to defend further this interpretation as Kelsen's 
own, but only to suggest that the interpretation is sufficiently plaus-
ible, given ambiguities in Kelsen's writings, that it compounds the 
confusion surrounding his theory of the basic norm. There are two 
points from the above discussion that I wish to emphasize. The first 
is that Kelsen's observation that judges in most legal systems believe 
that the system they administer is justified on its merits should be 
taken seriously by any legal theory that attempts to account for the 
phenomenon of legal obligation. The second is that whether this 
attitude is merely coincidental or is an essential aspect of the concept 
of law itself is not explicitly addressed and defended by Kelsen, al-
though he appears to assume that the attitude is e~sential to "law." 
One major goal of this essay is to explain how Kelsen's assumptions 
might be coupled with a theory of law unhampered by the mystifica-
tion that surrounds the metaphor of the judge as logician. 
C. H. L.A. Hart: The Judge as Game Player 
Much of the discussion generated by Hart's book, The Concept 
of Law, has focused on the notion of a "rule of recognition," which, 
like Kelsen's basic norm, is Hart's ultimate test of legal validity. Ac-
cording to Hart, however, the existence of a legal system depends 
on two conditions. In addition to general conformity to the rules 
that are valid according to the rule of recognition, the rule of recog-
nition must itself be accepted by certain members (at least the of-
ficials) of society. Hart introduces this· notion of acceptance to cor-
rect problems we have noted in the theories of Austin and Kelsen. 
' "Acceptance" is meant to correct defects in Austin's coercive model 
by providing a more adequate account of the obligatory nature of 
the law. It is also meant to replace Kelsen's "obscure" notion of 
presupposition25 with a simple empirical reference to the actual prac-
tice of the courts and officials of the system. 
Despite the key role that this concept thus plays in explaining 
legal normativity, Hart spends little time discussing the nature of "ac-
ceptance." What discussion does occur is in some respects at odds 
with Hart's careful analysis of rules and obligation and his account 
of the "internal attitude" that distinguishes following social rules 
24. Hughes, supra note 16, at 702. 
25. See H. HART, supra note 1, at 245 n.1. 
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from habitual conduct and from behavior influenced solely by coer-
cive threats. Consider, for example, the following: 
Not only may vast numbers be coerced by laws which they do not 
regard as morally binding, but it is not even true that those who do 
accept the system voluntarily must conceive of themselves as morally 
bound to do so, though the system will be most stable when they do 
so. In fact, their allegiance to the system may be based on many 
different considerations: oalculations of long-term interest; disinter-
ested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional atti-
tude; or the mere wish to do as others do. There is indeed no reason 
why those who accept the authority of the system should not examine 
their conscience and decide that, morally, they ought not to accept 
it, yet for a variety of reasons continue to do so. 26 
Compare this passage with Hart's earlier explanation of what it 
means for a group to accept rules as a common standard of behavior. 
Such acceptance, he explains, involves 
a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour . . . 
[that] should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), de-
mands for conformity, and in acknowledgments that such criticism 
and demands are justified, all of which find their characteristic ex-
pression in the normative terminology of "ought," "must," and 
"should," "right" and "wrong."27 
How can Hart claim that the acceptance of rules as standards of be-
havior implies a demand for conformity expressed in the normative 
terminology of "ought" statements and at the same time claim that 
such acceptance may be based, for example, only on one's own self-
interest in such rules? 
One possible explanation is that in the first-quoted passage Hart 
is talking about the "motives" for acceptance in a psychological 
sense. The "reasons" Hart describes for accepting a legal system 
would then constitute a report of the causes of the group's behavior, 
rather than a description of the group's internal attitudes toward the 
rules they accept. But if this is the sense in which the passage is 
to be interpreted, it need not concern us here any more than in the 
case of Kelsen. Our concern is with what the fact of acceptance 
implies in terms of the group's own attitude toward the accepted 
standards, rather than with a psychological account of why these par-
ticular attitudes develop. Besides, Hart's claim that one can decide 
after examination of his conscience that he ought not to accept the 
basic standards of the legal system suggests that this passage is not 
meant purely as a psychological explanation of why such standards 
are accepted. 
26. Id. at 198-99. 
27. Id. at 56. 
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A more plausible explanation is that Hart in both passages is will-
ing to allow the normative terminology backing the demand for con-
formity to range over the full variety of "ought" statements, from 
the prudential ("you ought to put antifreeze in, your car") to the 
aesthetic ("you ought not to wear a striped tie with that shirt") to 
the moral ("you ought not to steal"). This would explain why one 
can "accept" a legal system for reasons of self-interest, while admit-
ting that there are good moral reasons for not accepting it.28 
The trouble with this view is that if the normative language typ-
ifying "acceptance" is to range over any and all types of nonmoral 
"oughts," it becomes difficult to distinguish Hart's theory from Aus-
tin's. Imagine a legal system in which acceptance means no more 
than is suggested above by Hart. . Rex and his judge/ officials, who 
happen to have a monopoly on the state's coercive power, accept the 
rule that whatever Rex enacts is law. Their acceptance is based 
solely on the fact that Rex enacts laws which benefit himself and 
his judges at the expense of the rest of society. Rex even admits 
that morally his rules ought not to be accepted, but he and his of-
ficials continue to do so for reasons of self-interest. Presumably 
"obligation" in this system is found solely in the fact that officials 
who deviate from the accepted rules are met with the criticism that 
the rules are in the deviant's own self-interest-like explaining that 
one "ought" to put antifreeze in one's car. 
It is true that on this model the allegiance of the officials is volun-
tary and based on an appeal to self-interest, rather than a threat of 
force. Thus, one cannot describe the system as working only by 
"obliging." But what is needed is an explanation of how the fact 
of voluntary allegiance by itself adds an adequate concept of "obli-
gation" to the system. As noted in our discussion of Austin, "hench-
men" officials need only have the same reasons of self-interest for 
continuing to carry out the gunman's orders. Even in the case of 
a single ultimate sovereign who issues orders backed by threats to 
all citizens, including officials, the sovereign's continued acceptance 
of his "right" to govern is presumably a voluntary one. Nor can the 
point be that as soon as a certain number of people (more than one) 
accept the system, one has an "obligation" in a sense one did not 
28. That this appears to be Hart's view can be seen· from the following passage: 
Those who accept the authority of a legal system look upon it from the internal 
point of view, and express their sense of its requirements in internal statements 
couched in the normative language which is common to both law and morals: 
"I (You) ought", "I (he) must", "I (they) have an obligation". Yet they are 
not thereby committed to a moral judgment that it is morally right to do what 
the law requires. 
Id. at 199. 
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before. Austin's model also contemplates the possibility that the 
sovereign might actually be located in a "partnership" of several in-
dividuals ( as in the case of members of Parliament or the members 
of a ruling triumvirate). If moves of this sort are sufficient to avoid 
Hart's criticism of the gunman model, then the distinction between 
Hart's theory and Austin's begins to disappear. 
It may be possible to view Hart's model as an advance over Aus-
tin's by distinguishing the reasons for accepting a rule from the kind 
of criticsm that occurs when one deviates from the rule. At one 
point, in fact, Hart seems to suggest that the kind of criticism as 
well as the fact that criticism occurs is an identifying characteristic 
of rules of obligation, of which legal rules are a subclass. Such 
rules, Hart explains, are not only supported by serious social pressure, 
but are also "thought important because they are believed to be 
necessary to the maintenance of social life or some highly prized 
feature of it."29 This passage comes close to suggesting that the 
internal attitude of those who accept such rules is one of "justifed 
normativity"-i.e., that criticism is designed in part to remind one 
of the merits of the accepted rules. But this view contrasts sharply 
with Hart's insistence that rules can be accepted for reasons that 
have nothing to do with the merits of the rules: demands for con-
formity can presumably be made simply because the rules are accepted 
( for whatever reasons) by other members of the group. 
One way to reconcile these passages, while at the same time dis-
tinguishing Hart's theory from Austin's, is to view the judge as one 
views the player of a game or the member of a social club. In the 
case of games, the "merits" of the particular rules of the game are 
irrelevant to the claim that one has an obligation to follow the rules 
when playing. One may believe, for example, that chess would be 
a better game without the provision for castling-indeed, that the 
provision is inimical to the true "spirit" or "purpose" of the game, 
which, one may think, is to encourage slashing attacks and middle-
of-the-board king hunts. But even if one were correct in one's ap-
praisal of what the game of chess is all about, one's obligation is to 
play by the accepted rules until they are changed by authorized pro-
cedures. Similarly, members of a social club may believe that rules 
of the club regarding, for example, admission standards for new 
members, are not only morally unjust but also inimical to the club's 
purposes. Failure to observe such rules will nonetheless be met with 
criticism until they are changed, regardless of the correctness of 
29. Id. at 85. 
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one's appraisal of the rules on the merits. In both cases what under-
lies such criticism is the fact that others accept a rule plus some rea-
son (for example, tacit agreement to play by the rules) that explains 
why acceptance by some calls for compliance by others, regardless 
of disagreement about the merits of the accepted rules. 
This view of Hart's theory explains why a judge may have many 
reasons for "accepting" the rule of recognition-for agreeing to 
play-ranging from self-interest to a belief that the "game" he is 
playing is morally justified. It also explains why the judge who fails 
to conform, whatever his reasons for accepting the rule of recogni-
tion, will face criticism of an arguably different sort from that which 
the judge as henchman faces. He must either follow the rules or 
get out of the game, resign from the club. If Austin's theory is the 
"gunman situation writ large," Hart's, as one commentator has ob-
served, is "Monopoly writ large."30 
D. An Alternative View: The Judge as Priest 
If one turns from the narrow class of jurisprudential literature 
deliberately aimed at analysis of the concept of law to the broader 
class of legal literature in general, one soon discovers a persistent 
alternative view of the judge that casts him in the metaphorical role 
of a priest. Evidence of this view's persistence is furnished in part 
by the fact that it has long been the object of scornful attack by real-
ists and positivists alike, eager to debunk the myth that lies behind 
the metaphorical image. The myth, presumably, is the idea, most 
often associated with natural law theories, that there is an essential 
link between law and justice, and that the judge's task, accordingly, 
is the secular equivalent of the priest's: both seek the normative 
standards that govern human conduct in ideals that transcend posi-
tive law or positive morality. 
The "judge as priest" is not the only metaphor that expresses 
this idea. In a well-known passage, Blackstone refers to judges as 
"the living oracles" of the law.31 Bentham, in response, makes no 
attempt to conceal his sarcasm in accusing "the great oracle of Eng-
lish jurisprudence" of "wandering in a labyrinth of rights and wrongs, 
and duties, and obligations and laws of nature, and other fictitious 
entities."32 Austin is scarcely less constrained in attacking the view 
30. Noonan, Book Review, 7 NATL. L. FORUM 169, 177 (1962). 
31. 1 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. See also J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES 
OF THE LA.w xi (1968). 
32. J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 2 n.a (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970). 
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of the Roman law compiler, Ulpian, that "[l]aw being the creature 
of justice, we the jurisconsults may be considered as her priests, for 
justice is the goddess whom we worship, and to whose service we 
are devoted. "33 
Among modem writers, few have explored this notion of the 
"priestly power"34 of courts more engagingly than Thurman Arnold. 
In The Symbols of Government, Arnold devotes several pages to a 
discussion of the analogy between law and theology: "Just as juris-
prudence today is the ultimate justification of the ideal of a rule of 
law above men, so the theology of yesterday was the ultimate justifi-
cation of a rule of a moral and logical god above men and even above 
governments."35 Arnold, of course, finds much in reality that does 
not correspond to the ideal. At the same time, he is far more sym-
pathetic than Austin or Bentham to the impulses of the "incurably 
romantic human race"36 which seem to make, it impossible to escape 
from or ignore this ideal element in the attitudes of people toward 
their fundamental legal institutions. 
This latter observation suggests a second idea implicit in the 
metaphor of the judge as priest, an idea that does not require linking 
that metaphor solely to natural law claims connecting legal and moral 
validity. One may agree that standards can be identified as "legal," 
even though they cannot be justified on moral or other grounds, and 
yet see in the metaphor an attempt to express the idea that those 
who accept the fundamental norms of the legal system believe that 
the system is so justified. Expressed in the terminology we have 
been using in this essay, the metaphor at least suggests that the con-
cept of obligation among those who accept the system is a c~ncept 
of justified normativity. Nonconforming behavior will be met, ul-
timately, with critical reactions designed to show that the ultimate 
rule of recognition is justified on its merits and for that reason 
"ought" to be accepted. 
A theory of law that made this description of the internal attitude 
of the officials of the system an essential aspect of the concept of 
law can be characterized in broad outline by contrasting the view 
of law that emerges from such a theory with Hart's view. First, the 
new theory agrees with Hart's in making the existence of a legal sys-
tem dependent on the acceptance of the basic rules by at least the 
33. J. AUSTIN, supra note 8 (Library of Ideas ed. 1954), at 189. 
34. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 186 (1962); see id. at 206, 224. 
35. Id. at 59. 
36. Id. at 71. 
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officials of the system. But the theory adds the qualification that 
the officials must also in good faith believe (and claim) that these 
rules are acceptable (in the sense of being worthy of acceptance) 
by those who are subject to the system's rules. 
Second, this claim of acceptability is essentially a moral claim-
a claim that the rules have value for the group in question and thus 
deserve allegiance. The claim has a moral character because it is 
backed by showing that there are good reasons (which may be self-
regarding or moral reasons) for all subjects to accept the system's 
norms.37 Grossly characterized, the theory essentially links "law," 
not with "justice in fact," but with a "claim to justice" on the part 
of the system's officials. 
Third, it is consistent with the theory that those who disagree 
with the attempted justification of the basic rules and do not accept 
the system may view the legal system as purely coercive-"obliging" 
rather than imposing obligations. Indeed, private citizens who be-
lieve that the implicit claim of acceptability is not made in good faith 
or is totally indefensible will perhaps be more outraged at the per-
ceived hypocrisy of the system than they might have been if law 
made no pretense to be anything but coercive. 38 
Fourth, it is also consistent with the theory that judges who do 
not believe the system is justified may "accept" the role of judge 
and work within that role to change or subvert the system. It is not 
consistent with the theory that all judges may in this manner ignore 
the merits of the rules they accept, finding legal obligation solely 
in the fact that others have accepted the rules. Demands for con-
formity must be supported by more than simply pointing to the fact 
of acceptance. That kind of criticism, however valid in the case of 
a game, would not under this theory support a claim of legal obliga-
tion. The question of how many officials must believe the system 
is acceptable for it to be "legal" cannot be precisely answered any 
37. See K. BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 309 (1958). 
38. Recent "political trials," in which defendants have attacked the legitimacy of 
the entire regime, provide additional evidence that this internal view of law is a per-
sistent phenomenon. The response of the Supreme Court to attempts at trial disrup-
tion also illustrates how explicit the "claim to justice" on the part of a judge can be: 
As guardians of the public welfare, our state and federal judicial systems strive 
to administer equal justice to the rich and the poor, the good and the bad, the 
native and foreign born of evecy race, nationality, and religion. Being manned 
by humans, the courts are not perfect and are bound to make some errors. 
But, if our courts are to remain what the Founders intended, the citadels of 
justice, their proceedings cannot and must not be infected with the sort of 
scurrilous, abusive language and conduct paraded before the Illinois trial judge 
in this case. 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970). 
1212 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75: 1196 
more than Austin could say how extensive the habit of obedience 
must be or Hart could say how many officials must accept the rule 
of recognition. It is sufficient, perhaps, to suggest that those offi-
cials whose acceptance is necessary for the existence of a legal sys-
tem must also claim that the system is acceptable. 
Finally, it should be noted that the basic claim that must be made 
in a "legal" system under this theory is that the fundamental, con-
stitutional design-the rule of recognition-is acceptable. Partic-
ular rules may arise that are difficult to justify or defend except on 
the ground that they are the product of a basic legal system that is 
itself worth preserving. In creating particular laws, one may, for ex-
ample, often be unable to do more than consider all relevant compet-
ing interests in producing a compromise that completely satisfies no 
one. The only claim that need be made in such a case is that the 
lawmaking process remains an acceptable one, despite occasional 
substantive results that on the merits cannot be specifically justified. 
III. Tow ARD A DEFINITION OF LAW 
As an empirical matter it could probably be established that all 
four views of the internal attitudes toward legal obligation discussed 
above are held at various times and in varying degrees in all or most 
legal systems. The attempt to do more than this and to claim that 
one view is a necessary feature of the concept of "law" presents the 
problem discussed at the outset of this essay: why is it not enough 
simply to note these theoretical differences without worrying about 
whether a social order that did not include a particular concept of 
obligation should be classified as a "legal system"? 
The answer to that question is beyond the scope of this essay, 
but it may be helpful to compare the theory that would result, as-
suming that the definitional problem could be resolved, with the 
theories we have been discussing. Kelsen, we have seen, seems to 
assume that the concept of justified normativity is an essential aspect 
of law, although he does not argue for it. The theory suggested 
here, then, may be viewed as an attempt to bring out from behind 
the veil of "presupposition" this implicit assumption in Kelsen's 
work. 
The primary contrast to Hart's theory lies in the suggestion that 
legal systems cannot be satisfactorily analogized to the game model. 
To tell the judge who questions the rules of the system that his choice 
is to play by the rules or resign ignores the fact that, unlike the player 
in a game, the judge cannot escape. His choice is either to become 
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a private citizen and be "obliged" by the system or to agree to serve 
as a judge and thus incur the additional minimal obligation associated 
with the "tacit" agreement to play by the basic rules. Similarly, un-
like a social club, legal systems do not purport to regulate the re-
lations of members only. Their "rules" extend to nonmembers as 
well; indeed that is their primary purpose. To respond to the judge 
who asks why he ought to apply such rules with a reminder that 
those are the rules of the "club" ignores the real concern that 
prompts his inquiry: what justifies my imposition of the club's coer-
cive power on nonmembers? 
There remains, then, the contrast between the coercive model 
of law and a model that sees law as making an essential claim to 
justice. Implicit in the latter model is the suggestion that there are 
practical or theoretical advantages in distinguishing the primary 
means of effecting social control into three basic categories: coer-
cive (organized sanctions alone); legal (organized sanctions plus a 
claim of acceptability); and moral (a claim of acceptability alone). 
I have been careful not to suggest that a definition of law that re-
quires a claim of acceptability to be made imports substantive, moral 
tests into the definition. The minimum claim to legitimacy may after 
all be the Hobbesian one that any law is better than none, · at least 
if minimum protections for person and property are provided. But 
it is doubtful that officials in modern states will be able to resort in 
good faith to the minimum Hobbesian justification for the basic rules 
they accept. 
In this respect, the alternative view of law suggested here lies 
somewhere between that of the rigid, natural-law theorist on the one 
hand, who refuses to call unjust law "law," and the extreme positivist 
on the other, who refuses to withhold the name of law from norms 
that, no matter how unjust, can produce the proper pedigree. Under 
the view suggested here, the actual justice or injustice of a system of 
norms is irrelevant to the system's status as "legal," and to that ex-
tent, the theory is consistent with positivism. But the theory refuses 
to view legal systems and legal validity as a matter of pedigree alone. 
It requires officials to claim and believe in the justice of the system's 
basic rules, which then (and only then) converts the system into a 
"legal system," however unjustified in fact such claims may be 
thought to be. This demand that the officials pay heed to the moral 
acceptability of the system they enforce may well furnish some small 
theoretical, and no small practical, limitations on the ability of an 
official to issue commands and at the same time to appeal to respect 
for "the law" in urging obedience to those commands. 
